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Abstract
The controversy that followed the publication of Bem’s (2011)
surprising results had the merit of focusing discussions on the
validity of the current paradigm in psychological science. It
has been argued that a tendency of journals to avoid publish-
ing null results, in addition to the further extinguishing of null
results through questionable researcher practices, is leading to
the promulgation of a multitude of ‘undead’ theories that have
little basis in fact (Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Francis, 2012). At
the same time, the field of AI has met with success precisely
by abandoning theory, prompting Noam Chomsky to remark
that it is deviating from anything previously seen in the his-
tory of science (see Cristianini, 2014). In this symposium the
speakers consider whether current theories offered by psycho-
logical science are valuable, whether there might be inherent
obstacles which are preventing the identification of valuable
theories, and whether psychological theory even matters at all.
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Overview
The speakers of this symposium will discuss the reliability
and value of psychological theory from multiple perspectives,
pooling expertise from a range of disciplines including psy-
chology, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic information
theory. Moritz Heene is Professor for Learning Sciences
Research Methodologies at Ludwig-Maximilians University,
and James Coyne is Professor of Psychology in Psychia-
try at the University of Pennsylvania. They will argue that
the Fail-Safe-Number used in psychological meta-analyses
is too weak to provide a reliable mechanism for falsifica-
tion. Greg Francis is Professor of Psychological Sciences
at Purdue University, with a research interest in replication,
statistical consistency and publication bias. He will discuss
his finding that the large majority of publications in empiri-
cal psychology include statistics which are “too good to be
true”. Invited speaker Nello Cristianini is Professor of Ar-
tificial Intelligence at the University of Bristol and a current
holder of the Royal Society-Wolfson Merit Award. He is well
known in the field of A.I. for his research contributions to the
statistical analysis of learning algorithms, with application
to support vector machines and kernel methods. Cristianini
will provide a review of recent developments in A.I., high-
lighting a paradigm shift away from theoretical understand-
ing towards prediction based on the statistical analysis of big
data. Phil Maguire, Director of Computational Thinking at
NUI Maynooth, will conclude the symposium by offering an
algorithmic information theory perspective on why theories
describing complex phenomena have lower generalizability
than those in the hard sciences.
Heene and Coyne: The failure of meta-analysis as a
weapon against undead theories
Publication bias arises whenever the publication probability
depends on the statistical significance of the results. Recent
research (Fanelli, 2010) has shown that theory supportive re-
sults are far more prevalent in psychology and psychiatry than
in the hard sciences (91.5% versus 70.2% in the space sci-
ences, for instance). The resulting tendency of psychological
science to avoid publishing null results not only severely lim-
its the replicability requirement of science, but also the valid-
ity of meta-analyses (Ferguson & Heene, 2012).
Rosenthal’s Fail-Safe-Number (FSN) (Rosenthal & Rubin,
1978) aims to estimate the number of unpublished studies in
a meta-analysis required to bring the meta-analytic mean ef-
fect size down to a statistically insignificant level. We con-
ducted a quantitative literature survey regarding the applica-
tion of the FSN within psychology ranging from 1979 until
2013. Despite early proofs of its invalidity (e.g. Iyengar &
Greenhouse, 1988), we found that its application grew expo-
nentially over the decades, illustrating the persistent shielding
of patently false claims from timely correction. We argue that
questionnable research practices severely reduce psycholog-
ical science’s capability to sustain a proper mechanism for
theory falsification, resulting in numerous ‘undead’ theories
that have little basis in fact (Ferguson & Heene, 2012).
Francis: Cargo cult thinking in psychology
In a commencement address at Caltech in 1974, physicist
Richard Feynman (1974) described “cargo cult science”,
where investigations appear to follow scientific methods but
do not actually produce scientific results. The term refers to
societies in the South Pacific that received aid from the allied
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forces during World War II. Once the war ended, the local
residents unsuccessfully attempted to bring airplanes loaded
with supplies back to the island by building elaborate props
and emulating the air traffic control and landing crews. Of
course, such efforts were futile because the residents were
merely acting out the behavior of the airport staff. Feyn-
man (1974) suggested that some scientists likewise emulate
the scientific method without actually understanding and fol-
lowing the principles of science.
Exploring this claim, I applied the Test for Excess Signifi-
cance (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Francis 2012) to detect
the presence of bias in the journal Psychological Science. The
probability of experimental success (power) can be estimated
from published experiments, and used to estimate the prob-
ability of success for a set of experiments. When findings
across experiments are “too good to be true”, readers should
suspect that null findings were suppressed, the experiments or
analyses were improper, or that the theory does not properly
follow from the data. For the 44 articles where the analysis
could be applied, over 80% of the articles appear to be bi-
ased. Consistent with Feynman’s claim, psychological scien-
tists may fully believe they are following good scientific prac-
tice while simultaneously producing fallacious arguments.
Cristianini: On the current paradigm in AI
The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has undergone many
transformations, most recently the emergence of data-driven
approaches centred on machine learning technology. The
present talk examines that paradigm shift by analysing the
contents of the longest running conference series in the field
using the conceptual tools developed by Thomas Kuhn.
A paradigm shift occurs when a new set of assumptions
and values replaces the previous one within a given scien-
tific community. These are often conveyed implicitly, by
the choice of success stories that exemplify and define what
a given field of research is about, demonstrating what kind
of questions and answers are appropriate, or: “what success
looks like”. The replacement of these exemplar stories corre-
sponds to a shift in goals, methods, and expectations. The
most recent such transition in the field of AI will be dis-
cussed, taking into account the appropriateness of analogous
approaches to different sciences and domains of society (see
Cristianini, 2014).
A debate has recently arisen when Noam Chomsky pointed
out that the current approach to AI corresponds to adopting
a new and different criterion of success than that tradition-
ally accepted in science. Similar changes have been seen in
genomics and other fields: predictions can sometimes be ob-
tained more easily than theoretical understanding. The ques-
tion we face involves the role of science: is it to provide pre-
dictions or a better understanding of reality?
Maguire: Theory resistance in complex phenomena
We explore the idea that the more complex a phenomenon,
the greater its resistance to theoretical modelling. Results in
algorithmic information theory have shown that the accuracy
of prediction of a theory is linked to the level of compres-
sion it achieves (see Li & Vita´nyi, 2008). Inanimate phys-
ical phenomena, featuring high levels of redundancy which
is easily extracted, are particularly well suited to theoretical
modelling. In contrast, the mind is a complex phenomenon
which is highly integrated (Maguire et al., 2014). Because of
this integration, it is much more difficult to generalize from a
small set of observations. A large quantity of theory must be
invested into neutralizing observer bias, minimizing the level
of compression that can be achieved.
The dearth of null results in psychological journals may
be symptomatic of the discipline’s complexity rather than re-
flecting a problem with review processes per se. When theo-
retical models tend to have low generalizability, failed repli-
cation studies hold less value than those that establish novel
effects. Journals adapt by applying a shotgun strategy, pre-
senting as many theories as possible in the hope of ‘getting
lucky’. We consider the possibility that the scientific method
is ill suited to the modelling of cognition, and that cogni-
tive science might meet with greater success by following the
paradigm shift in AI (Cristianini, 2014) and abandoning the
restrictive goal of seeking to understand the mind.
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